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Twelve years after the Colgan 3407 tragedy, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has yet to implement a pilot records database (PRD), as required by law, Robert Sumwalt wrote in a National Transportation Safety Board blog post. The NTSB chair calls it an “example of the glacial pace of the FAA’s rulemaking processes – even in the wake of a congressional mandate to get something done.”
“Perhaps the new Secretary of Transportation (Pete Buttigieg) can give a needed boost to this untenable situation,” Sumwalt challenges.
In the wake of the February 12, 2009 Colgan Air flight 3407 accident, an NTSB investigation “found that the captain had a history of piloting performance deficiencies, including having failed several flight tests. Possibly more troubling, he concealed these performance deficiencies from Colgan when he applied for employment,” the blog stated.
In response, the NTSB issued safety recommendations to the FAA to strengthen the way airlines ascertain a pilot applicant’s background, including requiring previous employers to disclose training records and records of any previous failures.
In a bill signed into law in August 2010, Congress required the FAA to establish a pilot records database (PRD), and stipulated that “before allowing an individual to begin service as a pilot, an air carrier shall access and evaluate . . . information pertaining to the individual from the pilot records database.” Items required to be entered into the PRD, and considered by hiring airlines, included “training, qualifications, proficiency, or professional competence of the individual, including comments and evaluations made by a check airman . . . any disciplinary action taken with respect to the individual that was not subsequently overturned; and any release from employment or resignation, termination, or disqualification with respect to employment.” Congress appropriated $24 million to help facilitate creation of the PRD.
“The FAA’s response reminds me of my college’s football team – they get off to a good start, but after scoring on the opening drive, they have difficulty executing for the rest of the game,” Sumwalt wrote.
The blog continues: “In early 2011, the FAA established an aviation rulemaking committee (ARC) to develop recommendations on the best way to implement the PRD. Despite the ARC completing its work and issuing a report to the FAA in July 2011 – just six months after being tasked with developing recommendations – it wasn’t until September 2015 that the FAA began a phased approach to implementing the PRD.
“By July 2016, Congress had become impatient with the FAA’s lack of progress. After all, it had been six years since the FAA was required to create the PRD, and there was still no appreciable progress. Congress gave the FAA a new deadline: it mandated the PRD be in place by April 30, 2017.
“Unfortunately, April 30, 2017, came and went. Still no PRD. Meanwhile, 40 days after that deadline, a young pilot applied for employment at Atlas Air and was hired shortly thereafter. As with the Colgan Air captain, this pilot concealed his history of performance deficiencies, which deprived Atlas Air the opportunity to fully evaluate his aptitude and competency as a pilot. He struggled with training at Atlas, but after failing his check ride, he was retrained and passed. Tragically, on February 23, 2019, on what should have been a routine cargo flight from Miami to Houston, this pilot, like the Colgan Air captain, encountered something that startled him. He overreacted and put the Boeing 767 into a fatal dive. The commonalities between the Colgan Air crash and the Atlas Air crash are striking: Both pilots had a record of poor performance prior to their employment, both pilots concealed that information when applying for airline employment, and both pilots misapplied the flight controls following events they weren’t expecting. Events that should have been easily corrected. Events that, tragically, led to their aircraft plunging to the ground.
“Neither of these sad events was an isolated case. Including these two crashes, the NTSB has investigated 11 air carrier accidents over three decades in which pilots with a history of unsatisfactory performance were hired by an airline and then were later involved in an accident attributed to their poor piloting performance.
“After years of foot dragging, last March, the FAA provided its first visible indication of moving forward with the PRD, publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to give the public a glimpse of what the proposed rule may look like – 10 years after Congress initially mandated it, and three years after the April 2017 deadline that Congress eventually imposed.
“The NPRM indicated that the PRD should be implemented sometime this year; however, the NPRM also proposes allowing a two-year phase-in period. This puts complete implementation somewhere around a 2023 timeframe, assuming this proposed timeline holds. If that’s the case, we will finally have the PRD 14 years after the Colgan Air disaster, 13 years after Congress mandated it, five years after the deadline imposed by Congress, and four years after the Atlas Air crash.”
“A crash is a tragedy,” Sumwalt concludes. “It’s even more tragic to see a similar crash happen again and again and not have the regulatory agency responsible for safeguarding the skies take corrective action in a reasonable timeframe. We’re past the point of reasonable, and the traveling public deserves better.”