MAXimizing Lessons Learned

Editorial Comment

There is an abundance of lessons to be learned from the Boeing MAX tragedies in Jakarta and Addis Ababa. Lessons about aircraft design, software, certification, safety culture, corporate decision-making, crisis reaction, communications. And training.

The entire global civil aviation industry hassuffered, is suffering, from the wake turbulence, not just the US aircraftmanufacturer and regulatory agency. The traveling public has not only lostconfidence in one model; by extension, all aircraft, manufacturers andauthorities are now suspect, and any incident on any flight is quicklymagnified across social media. Whistleblowers and self-appointed pundits aregranted instant credibility, even if their role and perspective is limited andlacking context.

Regaining shattered trust will be a prolongedprocess. One survey of flyers reported 70% would hesitate to book a flight on aMAX. One-fifth plan to wait until the aircraft has flown safely for a minimumsix months. A smaller percentage say they will never again board the type, regardless.

Lawyerly statements will not satisfy. Droppingthe MAX brand may be perceived as obfuscation. Savvy travelers, and nervousflyers, will be monitoring the scheduled aircraft type before booking a flight.

Even the FAA’s re-certification blessing willbe viewed with skepticism, as the original process appears flawed, not least byother international agencies which plan their own evaluation of any aircraftsystem and training changes.

Public faith will only return through thedemonstrated confidence of the people who know aircraft best, and whose livesare daily dependent on repeated safe operation – the pilots and cabin crews.

The training community are critical players inthe process. There are allegations that airlines pressured Boeing to design theMAX to avoid ‘expensive’ simulator time during differences training. In therevamped training, there can be no question whatsoever that the pilotsthoroughly understand the aircraft’s characteristics and potentialmalfunctions, and every Captain and First Officer is fully competent to manageany crisis. This would be a good time to apply the wealth of aircraft andsimulator data available in a rigorous task analysis to develop an optimizedcurriculum with the latest training tools. If deemed necessary, bite the bulletand do some simulator sessions. And, as flight crews are re-trained, showelements of the training to the public and in pilots’ authentic words.

At the World Aviation Training Summit (WATS)in Orlando, 28-30 April, safety culture is a fundamental discussion theme, thethread running through all operational and technical considerations. And whichmust be the foundation for a flawless return to service of the MAX.

CAT is inviting representatives of the key stakeholders to addressthese challenges at WATS: Boeing, the FAA, the NTSB, other national regulators,airline operators, pilots, cabin crew, training experts. There is no betteraudience for such a dialogue than the 1,100-plus pilots, cabin crew,maintenance technicians and aviation training specialists from around theworld. They are extremely knowledgeable, they know the right questions to ask,and their primary focus is aviation safety. If this group embraces the plan,it’s on a good track.

In Japanese culture, when a precious vasebreaks, it is repaired with a technique called kintsugi. The fragments are re-joined with liquid gold or silver,both restoring the vase and enhancing it.

The past cannot be undone. The scars will always be there. We have the opportunity to put the pieces back together, to make them stronger, more refined, more resilient.

Rick Adams, CAT Editor

Published in CAT issue 6/2019